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1 Introduction
The impact of war on economic development is an important empirical question that is largely
debated in economics. Economic history has brought many contributions to address this question,
especially on the consequences of higher government spending and borrowing during the French
Wars. In his seminal contribution on the British industrial revolution, Williamson attributes rela-
tively slow economic growth and industrialization between the 1760s and the 1820s to a crowding
out effect caused by the British government’s debt financing of the French Wars.1 Barro contended
that government borrowing had a neutral effect on industrialization because it raised total savings
to pay the future tax increase instead of reducing private investment.2 Very recently, Ventura and
Voth argued instead that Britain’s debt accumulation had a positive effect on industrialization by
accelerating structural change.3
In the crowding out model, expansionary public spending reduces investment spending by the
private sector. The government is ”crowding out” private investment by increasing the demand of
loanable funds, thereby raising interest rates and depressing private investment. In the Spanish
case, the crowding out effect was potentially of crucial importance since warfare has been a central
feature of Spanish history at the turn of the nineteenth century. The dramatic increase in public
spending at that time inevitably led — to cite Marichal’s word — to the ”bankruptcy of empire”.4
War borrowing often has been charged to have negative repercussions on the private credit market
in Spain although its real impact has not been studied until now. The process of desamortizacio´n
(disentail) of mainmort assets, initiated to finance the crown’s debt, brought important structural
changes. According to Rosa Congost, it was at the origins of many social transformations of the
nineteenth century, among which the evolution of the structure of private credit markets was es-
sential.5
Indeed, the main peculiarity of Spanish long-term credit markets was the predominance of
ecclesiastical institutions as financial intermediaries and lenders.6 They received more than 70 per
cent of private annuities’ revenue prior to the outset of the war in the 1780s. Two decades later
though, they completely disappeared from the credit market panorama stopping their lending
activities. The secularization of the market came along with the rise of another private debt
instrument, the obligation.7 However, the withdrawal of ecclesiastical institutions left a significant
1For the impact of British government spending during the French Wars, see Williamson (1984); Heim & Mirowski
(1987); Black & Gilmore (1990); Clark (2001).
2Barro (1987).
3Ventura & Voth (2015).
4Marichal (2007). See also Fontana (1971).
5Congost (2009, p. 406).
6On the role of ecclesiastical institutions in the financing of the economy, a wide number of contributions can
be cited. Among them, see Alvarez Va´zquez (1987); Atienza Lo´pez (1987); Barrio Gozalo (1994–95); Llopis Agela´n
(1980); Lo´pez Martinez (1992); Marcos Mart´ın (1999).
7The rise of the obligation to the detriment of long-term annuities has been documented by Congost (1991);
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vacuum within the private credit market characterized by uncertainty and higher interest rates
until the emergence of a new mortgage system in the second half of the nineteenth century.8 This
paper aims at providing quantitative and qualitative evidence of a crowding out effect due to war
borrowing at the end of eighteenth-century Spain. In the second section, I examine the two key
links in the crowding out argument. First, did the Spanish government’s issuance of debt to finance
warfare result in higher real interest rates? Second, did it cause a reduction of private investment?
Annual data for long-term interest rates and for government borrowing allow examination of
the first link in the crowding out argument. Then, using original annual data on the volume of
long-term private credit that we collected from the mortgage registry of Madrid (Contadur´ıa de
Hipotecas de Madrid), we examine the second link of the argument. In the third section, this
paper analyses structural changes in the long-term private capital market. We argue that the
dramatic increase in public borrowing at the end of the eighteenth century to finance warfare
crowded out ecclesiastical institutions and shut down large part of the private credit market for
long-term annuities for the decades to come. We also show that the withdrawal of ecclesiastical
institutions in the 1790s came along with the rise of private obligations. Last section concludes.
2 Government borrowing, interest rates, and private in-
vestment (1768–1808)
At the time of the outset of the War of Independence of the United States, Spain had only a
small national debt. In the next 30 years, the total debt stock rose dramatically. Between 1779
and 1808, debt increased sixfold, from approximately 1,200 million reales to 7,200 million.9 To put
these sums in perspective, the average annual income from ordinary taxes in Spain between 1784
and 1788, years of peace, was around 500 million reales.10 The cost of the numerous wars that
followed the War of Independence was largely responsible. Between 1779 and 1807, Spain found
at war for 16 years, or almost two out of every three.11 The expenditure on the armed forces was
considerable, and constituted by far the single most important item of the government budget.
In this period, spending on the Army and Navy was equivalent to 58% of total spending.12 Once
the debt service costs were added to this figure, there was hardly any money left for non-military
spending.
The first step in testing the crowding out effect is to compute the size of government borrowing.
Dı´az Lo´pez (2001); Ferna´ndez de Pinedo (1985); Peset Reig & Blasco Gil (1992); Torre (1994); Tello Aragay (1994).
8Tello Aragay (2001).
9Fontana La´zaro (2001, pp. 198–9).
10Merino Navarro (1987).
11See App. 4.
12Merino Navarro (1987).
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Crowding out, and the scarce-factor-constrained vision of the economy generally, require measures
of real resource flows. In the case of government borrowing, the appropriate measure should
capture the real resource transfer to the government that results from the borrowing operations.
Such information is available in Merino Navarro’s book.13 Table 1 summarizes the new loans
taken out by the government in a given year in nominal values and real terms using Reher and
Ballesteros’ consumer price index as a deflator. The size of government borrowing during war years
was huge compared to peace years.
Figure 1 shows the path of overall expenditure and of total borrowing. Shaded areas indicate
wars. Dramatic spikes in total spending almost always coincided with major wars. The rise in
government borrowing during the three periods 1780–83, 1793–1802, and 1805–7, occurred while
Spain was either fighting overseas or at war with its neighbours. Once peace was concluded,
borrowing levels typically declined to very small amounts.
Figure 1: Government borrowing and expenditure in Spain, 1768–1807
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Sources: Based on Merino Navarro (1987). See Table 1.
The second step to examine the crowding out argument is to assess the volume of private in-
vestment. Like many other regions in Europe, the predominant instruments of long-term private
credit in Spain were obligations (obligaciones) and redeemable annuities (censos consignativos).14
13Merino Navarro (1987).
14Ferna´ndez de Pinedo (1985, p. 298). Three types of censos co-existed in early modern Spain. The censo
enfiteu´tico was a loan-lease contract. It was generally a lifetime or perpetual loan. Another legally defined censo
was the censo reservativo, the sale of a property by credit. These were two forms of indirect credit. By the sixteenth
century, a new form of censo became popular. It was the legally defined censo consignativo and the only one akin to
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Table 1: Nominal and real government borrowing, 1768–1804
Nominal Government Real Government
Borrowing Borrowing
(thousands reales) (thousands reales)
1768 11,434 14,584
1769 20,609 26,712
1770 30,741 42,503
1771 33,675 48,262
1772 22,229 30,357
1773 12,351 16,775
1774 12,652 18,126
1775 40,621 59,758
1776 50,571 74,287
1777 39,507 58,184
1778 37,944 53,821
1779 63,677 79,795
1780 348,129 401,880
1781 214,388 261,289
1782 327,898 444,909
1783 144,402 203,240
1784 26,457 34,083
1785 39,971 46,370
1786 17,401 19,464
1787 31,295 34,685
1788 55,594 60,444
1789 28,012 29,548
1790 30,100 32,932
1791 24,328 29,100
1792 17,076 19,781
1793 168,841 176,059
1794 593,313 615,310
1795 670,705 727,840
1796 104,041 103,704
1797 329,872 281,821
1798 422,296 346,286
1799 673,570 577,180
1800 695,328 578,716
1801 315,098 232,544
1802 330,664 202,241
1803 220,412 108,164
1804 231,736 105,274
1805 431,479 233,326
1806 529,495 395,071
1807 491,744 473,741
Notes: ”Nominal government borrowing” covers ”efectos extraordinarios”. Between 1780 and 1793, I added up
”negociacio´n de vales y letras”. Figures are deflated using the Reher and Ballesteros’ consumer price index. War
years are in bold.
Source: Merino Navarro (1987).
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The censo was a mortgage-backed loan supported by collateral that could be a real asset such as a
land, a farm, a house, or another mortgage loan. In this contract, the lender could not demand the
capital from the borrower: the latter repaid the capital whenever he wanted.15 By contrast, if the
loan was an obligation, the lender and the borrower mutually agreed on repayment by a certain
date and the contract could not bear any interest.16 In early modern Spain, censos were the domi-
nant credit instruments since they were thus the only legal way to draft long-term credit contracts
that involved interest at the time of usury prohibitions.17 In addition, since the obligation was
much more short term than the censo and mostly used for commercial credit, the difference in
average duration implies that the financial stock was overwhelmingly censos credit.18
I extracted from the mortgage registry of Madrid the annual volume of new censos. This archive
has never been used until now.19 In order to foster the development of credit markets, the Spanish
monarchy decided to create a public and universal system of information on mortgages.
This formal registration of mortgages started in 1768 with the creation of the mortgage registry
by the Bourbons.20 In these registries, each mortgaged loan had to be registered as soon as it was
secured by collateral. In theory, all the mortgages had to be recorded in the mortgage registry but,
in practice, these lien registries were not widely used at first, especially in Castile. However, over
time, Spaniards came to register more and more their mortgaged assets. This archive is divided in
553 blocks, called manzanas, which correspond to blocks of properties in the city of Madrid (see
Figure 2). I selected 191 manzanas where I recorded all the new censos between 1768 and 1808:
63 blocks are located mainly in South East Madrid where owners are in majority individuals (par-
ticulares) and 128 blocks are disseminated across Madrid and inhabited in majority by nobles.21
a mortgage (Quiroz, 1994, p. 197). In the rest of the paper, I will use the word censo instead of censo consignativo
for convenience.
15The censo was drawn up in such a way that it represented a contract of sale of goods where the lender
actually bought a rent sold by the debtor. This rephrasing made it possible to circumvent usury laws (Grafe, 2012;
Fiestas Loza, 1993–94, p. 223–4).
16Ferna´ndez de Pinedo (1985, p. 299).
17See Fiestas Loza (1984, p. 640); Sa´nchez Gonza´lez (1991, p. 285); Ferna´ndez de Pinedo (1985, pp. 299–300);
Ruiz Mart´ın (2016); Tello Aragay (1994, pp. 13–5) and for a non exhaustive list of authors see Tello Aragay (1994,
p. 10).
18In his study of the convent of Santa Clara de Estella, Joseba de la Torre observed that the average maturity of a
censo fluctuated from 36 years prior to 1750 down to 24 years between 1750 and 1769 and 13 years around 1770–80
(Torre, 1994). These results are consistent with my data which shows an average maturity of 15 years in Madrid
at the end of the eighteenth century. This average maturity seems similar to what we can observe in France since
the the average maturity of a rente constitue´e is around 15 years throughout the eighteenth century (see Hoffman
et al. (2001, p. 61) and Dormard (2005, p. 824)). By contrast, the obligation fell due in several months or years,
in general between three months and eight years (Tello Aragay, 1994, p. 13).
19It is still conserved in the Registro de la Propiedad in Madrid. Under Franco’s regime, mortgage registries
archives across Spain were transferred to the Historical Archives of their respective regions. However, the archive of
the mortgage registry of Madrid remained in the Registro de la Propiedad buildings which created some confusion
about the location of this archive.
20For a complete history of mortgage registries, and in particular of the Contadur´ıas de Hipotecas, until the end
of the nineteenth century, see Serna Vallejo (1996).
21The prevalence of a social group within a block can be found in Pinto Crespo & Madrazo Madrazo (1995, p.
113).
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Figure 2: Topographic map of the city of Madrid, 1768
Source: Archivo del Registro de la Propiedad de Madrid (hereafter ARPM).
This sample represents 34 per cent of the whole population, it includes poor areas as well as rich
areas, and selected manzanas come from South, North, West, East and central Madrid, which
makes it fairly representative.
The last two columns of Table 2 present the nominal volume of new censos per year, as well as
the real volume using the Reher and Ballesteros’ consumer price index. A cursory look at Figure
3 seems to support the crowding out argument for this period. Indeed, real private borrowing is
generally lower at wartime when government borrowing is high.
In Table 3, I examine the relationship between the variation in real government borrowing and
in real private borrowing. The growth of public borrowing do not have an immediate impact on
private borrowing but the coefficient of lagged growth public borrowing is negative and significant
at the five per cent level. For a one per cent increase in government borrowing, private borrowing
decreases by 0.62 per cent one year later. There is no anticipation effect from private agents.
How can we explain the reduction in private lending? The decline in private borrowing in
Madrid could have resulted from a decrease in the demand for loanable funds because of the war
and not have been the mere consequence of supply constraints. Commercial credit had certainly
been affected by the interruptions of trade during war years, but this type of credit was mainly
short term. On the contrary, censos contracts, mostly involved in construction, concerned long-
term credit, and this is not clear how construction would have been impacted in Madrid during
naval wars. Since an important share of long-term credit is supposed to solve life cycle problems,
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Table 2: Interest rates and private borrowing, 1768–1807
Nominal Real Nominal Private Real Private
Vales Yield Vales Yield Censos Censos
(%) (%) (reales) (reales)
1768 1,848,922 1,449,555
1769 1,162,372 896,770
1770 2,216,103 1,602,797
1771 1,791,063 1,249,714
1772 2,245,275 1,644,102
1773 4,639,018 3,415,477
1774 3,618,096 2,525,431
1775 4,155,051 2,824,396
1776 1,330,849 905,975
1777 2,679,457 1,819,351
1778 1,288,372 908,302
1779 1,957,028 1,561,708
1780 1,248,279 1,081,322
1781 553,157 453,865
1782 4.21 5.71 256,888 189,326
1783 4.21 5.92 463,258 329,144
1784 4.04 5.20 1,542,058 1,197,023
1785 4 4.64 1,333,693 1,149,643
1786 4 4.47 1,532,047 1,369,650
1787 4 4.43 1,052,912 949,989
1788 4 4.34 5,133,858 4,721,866
1789 4 4.21 803,333 766,299
1790 4 4.37 548,597 501,417
1791 4 4.78 804,508 672,568
1792 3.96 4.58 880,537 760,123
1793 3.96 4.12 1,555,600 1,491,820
1794 4.12 4.27 214,075 206,421
1795 4.59 4.98 601,264 554,064
1796 4.54 4.53 28,165 28,256
1797 4.70 4.02 343,000 401,481
1798 4.76 3.90 410,000 499,995
1799 6.34 5.44 69,922 81,598
1800 12.50 10.40 4,948 5,945
1801 8.69 6.41 39,291 53,239
1802 4.87 2.98 60,000 98,100
1803 6.15 3.01 40,000 81,510
1804 6.45 2.93 232,654 512,129
1805 7.40 4.00 8,785 16,245
1806 7.40 5.52 3,944 5,285
1807 7.54 7.27 97,000 100,686
Notes: Real yields and volume of credit are derived using the Reher and Ballesteros’ consumer price index. War
years are in bold.
Source: See text.
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Figure 3: Annual volume of new censos in Madrid, 1768–1807
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Sources: See Table 2 and Table 1.
especially to build a house, to set up a business, or to buy an office, lenders are usually older than
young borrowers.22 Therefore, one could reasonably assume that the demand for credit would
vary according to the number of young people in Madrid. Let us admit that the number of young
people is reflected by the number of marriages in the capital. If the number of marriages declined
at the end of the eighteenth century, we can expect that the demand for credit would decrease.
In contrast, the curve of marriages at the end of the century does not show any sign of decline
between 1790 and 1809.23
The crowding out model explains the negative impact of government borrowing on private
investment by higher real interest rates that an increasing demand for credit implies. Due to
frequent wars between 1779 and 1808, borrowing needs were substantial. The usual ways to
finance deficit, namely to resort to new taxes or donations, ran dry. Fear of riots, especially
after the French Revolution, and ancient fiscal privileges of Spanish historic territories and towns
restrained any leaning to increase revenues from taxes. The traditional remedy, custom duties and
transfers from Spanish America, dropped down to a minimum because of the British blockade.24
New financial instruments facilitated the growth in public debt. Prior to the eighteenth cen-
tury, most borrowing of the Spanish Crown was financed through juros. These perpetual bonds
22Hoffman et al. (2001, pp. 76–7).
23Pinto Crespo & Madrazo Madrazo (1995, p. 148).
24Liehr (1984, p. 558). See App. 4.
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Table 3: Regression results: government borrowing and private investment
Independent Variable Growth of Private Borrowing
Growth of public borrowing -0.621**
(n− 1) (0.263)
Growth of public borrowing 0.005
(n) (0.263)
Growth of public borrowing -0.216
(n+ 1) (0.264)
R2 0.14
Observations 37
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
were issued in the second half of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth cen-
tury, backed by a specific tax stream. In addition, short term borrowing in case of war by the
armed forces produced so-called asientos, effectively short-dated promises to pay. At the end of the
eighteenth century, Spain finally introduced a new type of annuities backed by the revenue of the
Tobacco Monopoly (”Tobacco censos”). In parallel, it issued the vales reales, long-term annuities
with a 20 years amortization scheme and carrying a yield of four per cent. The vales were first
issued in 1780 and were the first form of paper money in Spain. The vales were used as currency,
but since the unit value was large (600, 300, or 150 pesos each), they did not serve for retail
purchases, salaries, or similar payments. They rapidly became the chief public debt instrument
at the end of the eighteenth century.25 Between 1779 and 1783, they already represented 68% of
total borrowing.26
To examine the impact of government borrowing on interest rates, one potential problem that
could affect the response was the usury laws. At the end of the eighteenth century, private inter-
est rates were capped and could not exceed a three per cent ceiling. Such a ceiling would have
enhanced the ability of the government to sell bonds whenever the market rate was pushed at the
top or above the ceiling of three per cent. This could increase the wartime crowding out of private
investment by diverting even more funds to the government when private borrowers could not pay
the higher rates even if they wanted to. One solution to solve this problem consisted in finding one
debt instrument that was not subject to usury laws. Unlike most private debt instruments, the
vales were not subject to the usury laws, and were thus free to reflect conditions of stringency in
the debt market. I extracted from Tedde the annual average price of vales between 1782 and 1808
25Issues of vales are recorded in App. 4.
26Torres Sa´nchez (2013, p. 405).
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in the secondary market.27 Tedde recorded the quotation of vales in the secondary market for the
years 1782–1808.28 The nominal yield is defined as the coupon yield divided by the average price
of the vales on that year. To control for inflation, ”real” variables have to be computed, corrected
for changes in the price level. Thus the real interest rate will be defined as the nominal yield minus
the percentage rate of change of the consumer price index. Column 2 of Table 2 presents the real
vales rate, using the Reher and Ballesteros’ consumer price index.29 As for real private borrow-
ing, the yields are generally higher during war years than during the years of peace immediately
preceding and following. The assumption that a single interest rate can be used to represent the
whole spectrum of interest rates, long and short term, public and private, is restrictive. Available
data on interest rates is hard to find though and data on commercial interest rates is still lacking.30
Then, I instrumented the variation in the real yield on vales by the lagged growth of real
government borrowing using two-stage least squares regressions to examine the impact of real
interest rates on private borrowing. Table 8 reports results of the regressions.
The instrument is significant at the five per cent level. The Fisher statistic is rather low, which
is coherent given the number of observations. A one per cent increase in real government borrowing
is predicted to increase by 0.59 per cent the real yield on vales. In the second stage, the effect
of the variation in the real yield on vales is not significant since the P-value equals to 0.12. This
can be explained by the low number of observations which undermines the statistical power of the
two-stage least squares. Figure 3 also helps to understand why the effect is not significant. Shocks
on private borrowing can be easily identified. At each peak in government borrowing, private
borrowing collapses which suggests a non-linear effect. During these periods, private borrowing
is very low in any case. This explains why the variation in interest rates might not predict the
variations of private borrowing. However, the overall model is suggestive that there is a negative
relationship between the variation in the yield of vales and the growth of private borrowing.
The evidence on private market interest rates suggests a retraction of the supply in private
credit markets as well. If supply is contracting with respect to the demand, credit would decrease.
In that case, the interest should be drawn tight, the average rate should increase, and almost
all private annuities (censos) should get closer to the maximum legal ceiling (three per cent). I
recorded from my sample the interest rate bore by private censos. Figure 4 shows the evolution of
this interest rate. We can notice that the War of Independence (1779–83) provoked an increase of
the market interest rate from 2.5 per cent to its top ceiling three per cent. The increasing burden of
the war debt from 1779 to 1808 resulted in the increase in private interest rates to their maximum
legal ceiling. In 1799, the average interest bore by censos even exceeded this ceiling and reached
3.5 per cent.31
27Tedde de Lorca (1988, pp. 54, 234).
28App. 4. I assume that variations in the quotation of vales on the secondary market can be considered as a
proxy of the primary market history.
29Reher & Ballesteros Doncel (1989).
30Annual data for short-term interest rates (commercial credit) is still unavailable for eighteenth-century Spain.
One exception would be Cadiz between 1723 and 1788 (Nogues-Marco, 2011).
31On 12 September 1799, for example, the pious memory of Don Rodrigo de Herrera lent 44,000 reales to the
convent of San Felipe el Real in Madrid with a 4% interest rate. ARPM, Contadur´ıa de Hipotecas, Ma 203, 2484991,
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Table 4: Regression results: government borrowing, interest rates, and private in-
vestment
Independent Variable Growth Private Borrowing
OLS Estimates
Variation Real Vales Yield -0.434**
(0.199)
R2 0.17
2SLS Estimates
Variation Real Vales Yield -0.971
(0.636)
Observations 25
Reduced Form Estimates
Growth Public Borrowing -0.53*
(n− 1) (0.273)
R2 0.09
Observations 38
Independent Variable Variation Real Vales Yield
First-Stage Estimate
Growth Public Borrowing 0.593**
(n− 1) (0.255)
R2 0.11
F-Stat 5.39
Observations 25
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 4: Market interest rate on censos, 1768–1807.
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Source: See text.
The data on private censos described by A´lvarez Va´zquez showed the same trend.32 After a
decrease in private interest rates over the eighteenth century down to two per cent, the author
noticed that they went up at the end of the century and the beginning of the nineteenth century
to reach three per cent, their top ceiling. As a result, the decline in private long-term borrowing
is better explained by a contraction on the supply side.
To summarize this section, government borrowing to wage warfare at the end of the Ancien
Regime provoked a significant reduction of the volume of private credit. However, the econometric
model failed to indicate that a rise in real interest rates significantly reduced private borrowing,
even if market interest rates were higher during war years. Examination of the historical context
in the next section will unveil the mechanisms through which the Spanish monarchy crowded out
private investment.
48.
32Alvarez Va´zquez (1987).
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3 Crowding out, ecclesiastical credit, and the Spanish de-
samortizacio´n
In this section, I show that the historical evidence provides reasons why crowding out was
expected in the first place. I examine who were the actors of the private credit market and who
were the buyers of public debt. I discuss the potential effects on the private credit market of the
desamortizacio´n of mainmort assets that aimed at bailing out government finances.
The Spanish treasury suffered from the cost of Spain’s participation in not less than four wars
between 1779 and 1807. Between 1785 and 1807, government spending more than doubled due to
military expenditure (see Figure 1). As already said, during those years (1779–1808), government
debt increased sixfold, passing from approximately 1,200 million reales to 7,200 million.33 It was
barely impossible to resort to new taxes to cover this deficit or to rely on Spanish American
transfers due to British blockades. Borrowing was the only way to wage war.
At that time, ecclesiastical institutions represented a considerable source of capital, in which
the government could tap into. These benefited from many sources of capital pledged in religious
funds that they could subsequently lend out. Among these funds, pious works obras p´ıas, patronage
benefices patronatos, and chantries capellan´ıas were of primary interest.34 In 1794, an anonymous
memorandum reported that the estates of benefices, confraternities, and pious foundations must
be worth 3,000 million reales, and those of churches and religious orders another 4,500, more than
the total public debt reported to Napoleon in 1808.35
Spain’s entry into the War of Independence (1779–83) on the side of France and the new
American nation initiated a period of financial turmoil. Very rapidly, Spain had to turn to new
ways to raise capital to wage warfare. At that time, the idea was to benefit from mortmain capital,
owned by ecclesiastical institutions and entails (mayorazgos), without causing prejudice to the
privileged classes.36 One solution was to attract these capital. In 1780, the Spanish Treasury first
issued public redeemable annuities secured with the revenues of the Tobacco Monopoly in order
to divert private capital owned by pious foundations and entails to the royal treasury. These were
later called the Tabaco censos. Charles III decreed that all public deposits throughout Spain could
33Fontana La´zaro (2001, pp. 198–9).
34Pious works and chantries were the most popular ways of transferring capital. They differed from other sources
since these were monetary trust funds established for specific purposes, for example in the case of chantries singing
a stipulated number of masses over a certain time period for the spiritual benefit of a deceased person, generally
the donor. On one side, money was donated or pledged to pious works or chantries by other institutions or all kinds
of individuals; on the other, it was lent out by the ecclesiastical institution in charge in order to generate a regular
income and to accomplish the donor’s will (Wobeser, 1994, pp. 30–45).
35Herr (1989, p. 91). The debt of the Spanish Crown reported to Napoleon in 1808 was 7,198 million reales. The
memorandum evaluates to 200 million pesos the estates of benefices, confraternities and pious foundations and 300
million pesos those of the secular and regular Church.
36Mayorazgo is the Spanish term for an arrangement giving the right of succession to a specific parcel of property
associated with a title of nobility to a single heir. In Spain, it was a title of property, landed or funded.
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be pledged on the Tobacco Monopoly, paying a three per cent interest rate.37 Tobacco censos
were clearly designed in order to divert capital from deposits of private and public money, namely
capital from pious foundations, chantries, and entails.
The government allowed owners and administrators of those deposits to invest the capital in
Tobacco censos on which the Treasury would pay three per cent a year for as long as the money
was in its possession. This investment offered very advantageous conditions for the administrators
of these funds and for the Spanish monarchy. For the king, it was an easy way to raise cheap
capital. For the administrators of these funds, it was a safe and profitable investment. In the case
of pious foundations or patronatos, administrators had to invest the capital in censos to generate
a regular income and to accomplish the donor’s will as it was an obligation stemming from the
contract of the said foundation. As for entails, administrators could only legally invest capital in
censos as well.38 In 1780, the market interest rate of censos was much closer to 2.5 per cent than
three per cent (see Figure 4). In addition, the Tobacco censos were pledged on the revenues of the
Tobacco Monopoly that was considered as one of the safest income of the Crown. With a higher
rate of return and better guaranties for the administrators of foundations and entails, Tobacco
censos could only be a success.
Between 1780 and 1786, a total amount of 95.5 million reales was raised with Tobacco censos.39.
This represented almost 14 per cent of the Spanish new public debt raised between 1779 and 1783.
40 These four years also concentrated 96 per cent of the total capital borrowed by the government
through the Monopoly between 1779 and 1786.
Much of these public censos were signed in Madrid. They represented almost 50 per cent of the
total amount issued throughout Spain for the years 1780–6 (see Table 5). The mortgage registry
records in a separate section all the censos pledged on the Tobacco Monopoly that were signed in
the capital.
The mortgage registry allows covering a much longer period than 1780–6 (see Appendix 4). In
1794, confronted to increasing war expenditure due to the outset of hostilities against the French
Convention in 1793, the monarchy relied once more on the Tobacco Monopoly to raise capital. Be-
tween 1794 and 1795, it issued censos for 14 million reales just in Madrid, whereas it had almost
not borrowed for 10 years since the end of the War of Independence. Then, until 1801 and the end
of hostilities with the British, the crown regularly used the Tobacco Monopoly as a way to borrow
cheap capital.
One of the effects of crowding out is the resource transfer to the government of saving that
could have been invested in the private credit market. In Figure 3, the reduction of the volume
of new private censos is clearly visible between 1780 and 1783 during the War of Independence
when the Tobacco Monopoly started to borrow. The mortgage registry allows tracing back the
37Royal Decree (RD) 15–03–1780.
38Administrators had to send a request to royal jurisdictions in order to lend capital linked to an entail.
39Torres Sa´nchez (2015, p. 151)
40Torres Sa´nchez (2013, pp. 404–5). Three main public debt instruments were used in this period, the Tobacco
censos, the vales reales, and the vitalicios.
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Table 5: Tobacco censos signed in Madrid, 1780–6
Tobacco censos Spain Tobacco censos
Madrid
%
(reales) (reales)
1780 47,430,963 16,941,241 35.7
1781 22,213,763 13,419,350 60.4
1782 15,224,263 9,203,350 60.5
1783 7,160,049 3,734,659 52.1
1784 2,752,013 2,238,501 81.3
1785 582,938 118,926 20.4
1786 216,292 54,937 25.4
Total 95,580,281 45,710,964 47.8
Note: War years are in bold.
Sources: For Column 2, see Torres Sa´nchez (2015, p. 150). For Column 3, see text.
buyers of Tobacco censos signed in the city of Madrid. Table 6 records the lenders to the Tobacco
Monopoly.
Table 6: Lenders to the Tobacco Monopoly in Madrid, 1780–1808
Ecclesiastical institutions
Entails
Othersc
(mayorazgos)
Pious
Othersb Total
foundationsa
% total
contracts
47.07 9.57 56.64 38.27 14.66
% capital lent 25.86 21.67 47.53 37.16 15.31
a Aniversarios, beneficios, capellan´ıas, memorias, obras p´ıas, patronatos.
b Convents and monasteries (men and women), brotherhoods, parishes, bishoprics, and church staff.
c Institutions (hospitals), lay individuals, and unknown.
Sources: See text.
Ecclesiastical institutions provided almost 50 per cent of the amount lent to the Tobacco
Monopoly in Madrid. Within this group, pious foundations were the main sources of capital for
public credit by providing 26 per cent of the total amount lent. In second position, the nobility
through their entails provided another 35 per cent of the amount lent to the Monopoly.
Similarly, ecclesiastical institutions and the nobility were the main providers of private credit
in eighteenth-century Madrid. In Table 7, I traced back the lenders between 1768 and 1808 within
the long-term private credit market. Ecclesiastical institutions and the nobility provided 91 per
cent of the capital lent on the long-term private credit market. Compared to the whole Spain,
the share of ecclesiastical institutions is a bit lower than the figures provided by the Cadastre of
16
Ensenada (63 per cent versus 70 per cent). This is explained by the over representation of the
nobility in Madrid as the economic and political capital.
Table 7: Lenders in Madrid (censos), 1768–1808
Ecclesiastical
Nobility Othersc
institutions
Pious
Othersb Total Entails Nobles Total
foundationsa
% total
contracts
42.71 20.11 62.82 24.46 2.85 27.31 9.87
% capital
lent
22.70 20.30 43 40.47 7.89 48.36 8.64
a Aniversarios, beneficios, capellan´ıas, memorias, obras p´ıas, patronatos.
b Convents and monasteries (men and women), brotherhoods, parishes, bishoprics, and church staff.
c Institutions (hospitals), lay individuals, and unknown.
Sources: See text.
Crucially here, Tables 6 and 7 show that the lenders to public authorities were the same as
the lenders in the private credit market. There is only one step to conclude that the drop in
private investment during war years is due to the lenders’ preference to invest in Tobacco censos,
at least in Madrid. Capital from pious foundations and entails were diverted to Tobacco funds
instead of being re-invested in the private credit market. The data that I extracted from the
mortgage registry of Madrid on Tobacco censos allows looking more precisely at the impact of
public borrowing on private credit activities. I generated a dummy variable taking value one if
the Tobacco Monopoly borrowed in a given year.41 Ordinary Least Squares regression was run to
examine the effect of the introduction of Tobacco censos (public censos) in a given year on the
volume of new private annuities (private censos). Table 8 gives the results.
Results show that private borrowing significantly reduced by half when the Tobacco Monopoly
borrowed in Madrid. As mentioned earlier, Tobacco censos are a good proxy of government war
borrowing. Tobacco censos absorbed large parts of private capital deposited in pious foundations
and entails that has not been lent to private parties. Figure 5 clearly shows the different patterns of
the private credit markets. On the one hand, private parties lent on average 1,547 thousand reales
per year in the case the government did not sell Tobacco censos. On the other hand, whenever the
government borrowed a given year through the Tobacco Monopoly, they lent only 733 thousand.
This is not surprising since private censos and Tobacco censos can be considered as perfect substi-
tutes. They were exactly the same instruments with the difference that Tobacco censos provided a
higher rate of return and better guarantees. In addition, Tobacco censos are specially oriented to
pious foundations and entails which are the main providers of private credit. Qualitative evidence
supports that hypothesis. Many examples of redemptions of censos during those years stipulated
that the redeemed capital had been pledged on the Tobacco Monopoly. In these cases, I could
41I did not take variations in Tobacco censos across years since the presence of modalities taking value zero
distorted the regression.
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Table 8: OLS regression results: real private borrowing and Tobacco censos in
Madrid, 1768–1807
Dependent
Variable
Real Private Borrowing
Coefficient t-statistic P value Adjusted R2
Independent
Variable
Dummy Tobacco
censos
-814,380** -2.50 0.017 0.12
Constant 1,547,131*** 5.67 0.000 0.12
Notes: Figures are deflated using the Reher and Ballesteros’ consumer price index. Significance levels: * p < 0.1;
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Sources: See text and App. 4.
find the annotation: ”considered paid and redeemed the said censo owned by the said memory of
Don Ygnacio Buitrago, and free the said house, through the transfer that made the owner to the
General Treasury of Her Majesty for a new censos secured by the Tobacco Monopoly”.42 It shows
that once the capital of a censo was redeemed during the years of interest, it was more interesting
to invest it in public censos (Tobacco censos).
In parallel to Tobacco censos, the Spanish government borrowed via the creation of paper
money, the so-called vales reales mentioned earlier. In 1780, it first issued 16,500 vales and made
two more issues in 1781 and 1782. Between 1779 and 1783, the vales contributed for 68 per cent
of the new public debt for a total amount of 450 million reales.43 Until 1794, despite two further
issues in 1785 and 1788 for 99 million to subsidize the building of the canals of Aragon and Tauste,
vales were broadly quoted at face value. Actually, at the opening of the last decade of the century,
Spain was in a strong financial position.
Spain’s entry into the war against the French Convention in 1793 set off a new period of trial for
its fiscal strength. Very rapidly, the monarchy found itself confronted to a growing annual deficit.
The reply of the monarchy to the imperative needs for funds was to renew the creation of vales as
for Tobacco censos. On 1 February 1794, the government issued 16,200,000 pesos, approximately
243 million reales. In parallel, the king signed along with this decree another that proclaimed the
vales to be a ”national debt contracted in the public interest” and created an amortization fund
(fondo de amortizacio´n). In order to maintain the reputation of the vales, this fund was charged
with extinguishing this debt and was provided with two sources of income. Municipalities were
ordered to pay the fund 10 per cent of their incomes and the national Bank of Saint Charles was
42”da por quitado y redimido el expresado censo perteneciente a dicha memoria de Don Ygnacio Buitrago, y por
libre de el la Casa referida, mediante la entrega que hizo S.E. la Duen˜a en Tesoreria Mayor de S.M. para nueva
imposicion sobre la Real Renta del Tabacco”. ARPM, Contadur´ıa de Hipotecas, Ma 494, 2484277, 18.
43Torres Sa´nchez (2013, pp. 404–5).
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Figure 5: Average private borrowing over Tobacco censos, 1768–1807
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Sources: See text.
to contribute the fees it received for the export of specie from Spain.
Very soon, the government was forced to make two more issues of vales, one on 15 September
1794 for 18 million pesos and another on 15 March 1795 for 30 million pesos, respectively 270
and 450 million reales. To sustain the value of the vales, the king further provided new sources of
income for the amortization fund. Among these, the clergy was to provide an annual subsidy of
seven million reales out of its income from properties, including censos and, on 21 August 1795,
the king decreed a capital levy of 15 per cent on all property acquired in the future by mortmain
institutions (secular v´ınculos, entails, and ecclesiastical institutions). These three issues of vales
brought 964 million reales to the royal treasury, three-quarters of the total deficit for the years
1793–96.44
Between 1796 and 1798, the government resorted mainly to free and forced loans to avoid
overissue and paper money inflation.45 However, the resumption of hostilities against Great Britain
in 1796 severely undermined the credit worthiness granted to the monarchy. The impact on the
vales quotation was immediate and, by the beginning of 1798, these quoted at a 15 per cent
discount. On 9 March 1798, the king established an Amortization Fund (Caja de Amortizacio´n)
as a separate institution with its own director to support the vales quotation. He charged it with
redeeming and paying the interest on the government debt. It was assigned the sources of income
44Herr (1989, pp. 81–3).
45Barbier & Klein (1981, p. 325).
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previously established for the first amortization fund created in 1794. However, the creation of a
new fund did not have any effect on the royal credit and the discount on the vales even worsened
from 15 to 17 percent in May. To get things worse, the predicted deficit for the year 1798 was 800
million reales and the government urgently had to find new sources of revenue. Confronted to the
gravity of the situation, the king took extraordinary measures and initiated the first step of the
long process of desamortizacio´n. On 19 September 1798, he decreed:
In order to continue procuring the welfare of my beloved subjects by all possible
means amid the present urgent needs of the crown, I have believed it necessary to
dispose of a massive fund that can serve two objectives. One is to substitute for the vales
reales another debt with lower interest and fewer problems. The other is to give relief
to the industry and commerce by extinguishing the vales reales through more effective
measures than those already adopted. Since my sovereign authority to make use of
public establishments for these and other ends of the state is undisputed, I have resolved
after mature consideration to alienate all the real property belonging to hospitals,
hospices, houses of charity, homes of the aged, foundling homes, confraternities, pious
memories, pious works, and lay benefices. The product of these sales will be deposited
in my Royal Amortization Fund at three-percent interest per annum, as will the capital
of any censos owed to these establishments and foundations that are redeemed.46
In brief, this decree ordered that liens and mortgages whose interest supported pious works,
chantries, and the like should be redeemed and the proceeds to be loaned to the monarchy. It
permitted persons whose properties were encumbered by censos in favour of these institutions to
redeem them by depositing their capital value in the Amortization Fund in the name of the insti-
tution.47 As a result, the capital was not re-lent to a private party but to the monarchy. Then,
in 1801, capital endowments of mayorazgos and other secular entails were also targeted.48 The
owners of entails were not required to sell their lands, but they did have to deposit the capital
received of a redeemed censo in the Amortization Fund.
Unfortunately for the crown, the announcement of the sale of entailed real assets did not restore
its credit. On 8 April 1799, pressing financial needs led the crown to announce a new issue of vales
for almost 800 million reales, the largest ever, to wage the deficit. The market value of vales fell
between 30 and 45 percent below par in the first half of 1799 and one year later, they were being
exchanged for little more than one quarter of their face value. In 1800, Charles IV decreed the
creation of a new institution to collect and manage all the income assigned for the guarantee and
amortization of the vales, entirely separate from the royal treasury. On 28 November 1804, the
second phase of the consolidation even went one step further with the extension of the process of
desamortizacio´n to the Spanish Empire.49 Finally, between 1800 and 1808, the new Consolidation
46RD 19–09–1798.
47Also frequent was the establishment of a censo perpetuo as a permanent endowment without any loan being
involved, that is why there are not taken into consideration here.
48Royal Ce´dula 17–04–1801.
49RD 28–11–1804.
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Fund only redeemed vales totalling 300 million over the 2,193 million in existence.50
It is relatively difficult to study the proceeds of desamortizacio´n assets for the crown. Never-
theless, the total amount reported to Napoleon for the two funds in 1808 is 1,653 million reales.51
This sum includes both money received by the monarchy for the sale of real properties and money
received as redemption of censos.52 R. Herr estimates that 4.5 per cent of the total ecclesiastical
deposits came from redeemed censos totalling 112 million reales. However, this share hides im-
portant regional differences, since it goes up to 61.5 per cent in Catalonia.53 In Madrid, redeemed
censos from ecclesiastical deposits and from secular entails represented six per cent of the deposits
in the two Funds amounting 14 million reales, which does not show a clear success of incentives to
redeem the capital of censos considering that Tobacco censos signed in Madrid brought nearly 82
million reales.54
However, the impact on private lending was blatant. Talking about the Spanish American
case, Grafe and Irigoin argued that the process of desamortizacio´n certainly ”created severe in-
terruptions in lending, mainly because the ”dead hand” had been very much alive and active in
banking”.55
To assess the considerable impact of the consolidation laws on the volume of long-term private
credit, Figure 3 is particularly enlightening. As we discussed earlier, the contraction of private
credit between 1780 and 1783 is mainly due to the War of American Independence and Tobacco
Monopoly issues. Then after a sharp decrease in 1790 that is mainly due to the presence of several
outliers in 1789, the volume of new private censos declines significantly from 1794. On the same
year, the Spanish government revived the creation of vales and the sale of Tobacco censos although
it had almost not borrowed for 10 years. The perfect substitution with Tobacco censos and the
alternative investment in vales undermined private investment. Figure 3 shows the progressive
withdrawal of the censo debt instrument from the mid-1790s. This withdrawal started four years
before the consolidation laws and became completely effective in 1800 where the capital amount
of new censos was almost zero. Since 1794 and the creation of the first sinking fund, ecclesiastical
institutions and entails could already understand what would be the future of their funds. Eccle-
siastical assets came more and more under attack since 1767 and the suppression of the Society
of Jesus. More generally, mortmain institutions, including entails, were severely criticized by con-
temporaneous Spanish arbitristas.56 Reformers blamed them with preventing the multiplication of
small farms and causing great harm to agriculture. The Spanish monarchy just implemented the
ideas of reformers but certainly had not in mind the consequences of a withdrawal of monetary
50Herr (1989, p. 118).
51Herr (1989, p. 122).
52Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between the two, and a fortiori between redeemable censos and perpetual
ones.
53Herr (1989, p. 124).
54Idem. However, R. Herr estimates that 25 per cent of the ecclesiastical properties in Madrid were sold (Herr,
1989, p. 129).
55Grafe & Irigoin (2013). On Spanish America, see also Chowning (1989); Liehr (1984); Greenow (1983).
56See for example Jovellanos (1795) or Vizcaino Pe´rez (1766).
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funds attached to entails and pious foundations on the private credit market. This decline in the
volume of new censos is also associated to a complete disappearance of ecclesiastical institutions
on the private credit market. From 1794, ecclesiastical institutions almost stopped their lend-
ing activities. Then, from 1798, they were in any case forced to re-invest their monetary funds
in the Consolidation Fund. Censos destiny was actually linked to ecclesiastical institutions and
entails as they represented almost 96 per cent of the market (at least in Madrid). Since these in-
stitutions stopped lending to private parties because of the consolidation laws, the censo was dead.
At the same time, another debt instrument already mentioned earlier became the leading debt
instrument. Concomitantly to the removal of ecclesiastical institutions and censos in the mid-
nineties, I could notice in the mortgage registry records that obligations bore more and more an
explicit interest rate, generally between 4 and 6 per cent. Ecclesiastical institutions did not use
that instrument since their monetary funds could only be lent via censos and that obligations could
not meet their need for a regular stream of income. As Figure 6 shows, the censo almost completely
disappeared from credit markets in the 1790s. Instead, the obligation became the dominant debt
instrument and was more and more used across time.
Figure 6: Real annual volume of new loans in Madrid, 1769–1852
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Note: Three-year moving average. Source: see text.
Interestingly, it seems that the whole private credit market suffered considerably from the
withdrawal of ecclesiastical institutions. During the 1790s, the obligation became the most popular
debt instrument. However, it had a much shorter lifetime than the censo even if it transformed
over time into a mid-term debt instrument. From the sample of obligations and censos that I
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constructed, the average maturity of an obligation increased from nine months between 1768 and
1777, to one year between 1778 and 1828, and two years between 1828 and 1853. On the contrary,
the average lifetime of a censo was 14.8 years. This allows us to compute the stock of capital. The
stock of capital in year t is defined as the stock of capital in year t-1 plus the capital lent in year t
minus the capital that was paid off in year t. The new loans are directly given by the new censos
and obligations recorded in the mortgage registry. I can deduce the amount of capital paid off
each year from the inverse of the theoretical maturity ”d” of each kind of debt instrument (1/d).57
Figure 7 shows the stock of capital of censos and obligations between 1768 and 1853.
Figure 7: Real annual stock of mortgage credit in Madrid, 1768–1853
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It indicates that the collapse of the censo and of ecclesiastical institutions in the 1790s was
dramatic for the private credit market. The stock of capital of the private credit market only got
back to its 1770s level in the 1840s. In addition, the stock of obligations in the 1840s did not
bear the same constraints as the stock of censos in the 1770s. Obligations had a shorter maturity
than censos (two years versus 15 years). As a result, even if the amount of outstanding debt was
equivalent in 1770 and in 1840, the result was quite different for the borrower. Facing the odds of
frequent renewals, the stock of obligations, although it is similar in volume, is much more volatile
than the stock of censos and implies huge uncertainties for the borrower.
The consolidation of the vales, by forcing ecclesiastical institutions to deposit their funds in
the Consolidation Fund provoked a huge contraction of the private credit market. During four
57I followed Hoffman et al. (2001). For 1768, I took the average volume of new censos and obligations of the first
five years and multiplied it by their respective maturities.
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decades, the overall trend of the stock of private debt is divided by five. Censos, as well as the
Church, almost disappeared from the private credit market and left a gap in long-term lending
that no debt instruments or financial institutions could fill.58
4 Conclusion
This chapter provides a new stance on the impact of public borrowing on private investment. I
showed that massive war borrowing at the end of the eighteenth century crowded out private credit.
Beyond the effect of an increase in interest rates in a classical crowding out model, I analysed the
historical evidence and political context that brought the monarchy to borrow massively and to
initiate the process of the Spanish desamortizacio´n. Given the central role of ecclesiastical institu-
tions in private credit markets, I studied the impact of this process on the volume of private lending.
The desamortizacio´n of ecclesiastical financial assets and secular entails shut down a large part
of the private credit market. The effect is huge. After a domination of almost three centuries on
Spanish credit activities, ecclesiastical institutions, as the major actor in the credit market, van-
ished in only two decades. Concomitantly, credit instruments changed: the censo became rapidly
an antiquity and gave way to the rise of the obligation. The withdrawal of ecclesiastical institutions
from the credit market severely undermined mortgage credit markets. For four decades, the overall
stock of mortgage credit has been divided by five and mortgaged obligations only recovered the
same volume as censos only in the 1840s. To my knowledge, there is nothing comparable elsewhere
in Europe.
The sharp drop in long-term private lending is a first indication of a potential deleterious effect
of the desamortizacio´n on the economy. The contraction of mortgage credit in the first half of the
nineteenth century might have held back industrial development and obstructed Spain’s economic
development. We need more studies on the causes and consequences of this sudden withdrawal of
key financial institutions.
58These results have to be qualified though. Although censos have to be systematically recorded in the mortgage
registry because they were pledged on real properties, obligations were not all secured on real assets, thereby
underestimating the stock of obligations. One result remains obvious: the collapse of ecclesiastical institutions in
the 1790s came along with the demise of the censo, the most popular long-term debt instrument at the time.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Wars of Spain
War of Spain against Years
Great Britain 1779–1783
France 1793–1795
Great Britain 1796–1802
Great Britain 1805–1807
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Appendix B
Transfers of silver from Spanish America
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Source: Based on Marichal (2007, pp. 268–9).
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Appendix C
Issuance of vales and date of issuance
600 pesos 300 pesos 150 pesos Capital (reales)
30–09–1780 16,500 149,082,352
14–02–1781 17,667 79,813,270
22–05–1782 49,333 222,869,082
12–01–1794 53,333 240,939,670
29–08–1794 10,000 80,000 271,058,823
25–02–1795 15,000 140,000 451,764,705
06–04–1799 44,257 88,517 799,763,576
Total 85,757 208,850 220,000 2,215,291,482
Source: Tedde de Lorca (1987, p. 171).
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Appendix D
Average monthly price of the vales, 1782–1808
Year Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average
1782 / / / / / 97 / / / / / 92 95
1783 90 95 95 94 93 95 96 97 96 96 96 96 95
1784 97 97 97 98 99 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 99
1785 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1786 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1787 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1788 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1789 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 101 100 100 100
1790 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1791 101 100 101 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1792 101 102 102 102 102 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101
1793 101 100 100 100 100 100 100 101 101 101 101 101 101
1794 101 100 100 100 100 100 98 97 95 96 95 83 97
1795 85 92 87 89 85 84 82 84 92 87 86 88 87
1796 89 91 91 89 90 91 86 87 87 89 85 85 88
1797 84 84 84 84 84 84 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
1798 86 85 86 86 83 83 83 83 83 83 82 82 84
1799 74 67 67 61 55 55 64 / / / / / 63
1800 32 32 32 31 31 31 34 34 32 34 33 33 32
1801 35 35 38 43 42 41 48 43 43 45 70 70 46
1802 68 80 84 92 92 87 87 85 81 77 78 78 82
1803 79 79 74 68 62 55 59 57 56 54 70 67 65
1804 66 67 67 66 65 64 64 64 6 63 51 44 62
1805 49 48 52 56 61 61 61 63 53 42 49 55 54
1806 56 58 56 53 52 52 50 53 56 50 50 50 54
1807 53 53 53 53 53 54 58 56 53 50 50 50 53
1808 50 42 38 50 40 / / / / / / / 44
Note: Figures are in % of the nominal value. /: no data.
Source: Tedde de Lorca (1988).
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Appendix E
Nominal and real volume of Tobacco censos in Madrid, 1780–1805
Nominal Tobacco Censos Real Tobacco Censos
(reales) (reales)
1780 16,941,241 14,675,350
1781 13,419,350 11,010,577
1782 9,203,350 6,782,869
1783 3,734,659 2,653,475
1784 2,238,501 1,737,636
1785 118,926 102,514
1786 54,937 49,113
1787 1,500,000 1,353,375
1788 0 0
1789 3,300 3,128
1790 0 0
1791 0 0
1792 0 0
1793 150,000 143,850
1794 9,174,353 8,846,370
1795 5,000,131 4,607,621
1796 2,257,343 2,264,679
1797 2,816,104 3,296,250
1798 1,502,946 1,832,843
1799 6,938,574 8,097,316
1800 3,394,532 4,078,530
1801 2,778,335 3,764,644
1802 789,451 1,290,752
1803 81,254 165,575
1804 0 0
1805 20,137 37,238
Source: See text.
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